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Immigration, Citizenship, and the Size of Government 
 
This paper analyzes the political sustainability of the welfare state in an environment where 
immigration is the main demographic force and where governments are able to influence the 
size and skill composition of immigration flows. Specifically, I present a dynamic political-
economy model where both income redistribution and immigration policy are chosen by 
majority vote. Voters take into account their children’s prospects of economic mobility and the 
future political consequences of today's policies. Over time, the skill distribution evolves due 
to intergenerational skill upgrading and immigration. I consider three immigration and 
citizenship regimes. In the first, immigrants stay permanently in the country and citizenship is 
obtained by birthplace (jus soli). In the second regime immigration is also permanent but 
citizenship is passed only by bloodline (jus sanguinis). In the third regime immigrants are only 
admitted temporarily and cannot vote. Our main finding is that under permanent migration 
and jus soli there exist equilibria where income redistribution is sustained indefinitely, despite 
constant skill upgrading in the population. However, this is not the case in the other two 
regimes. The crucial insight is that unskilled voters trade off the lower wages from larger 
unskilled immigration with the increased political support for redistributive transfers provided 
by the children of the current immigrants. In contrast, in the regimes where immigrants and 
their children do not gain the right to vote, unskilled voters oppose any unskilled immigration 
and political support for income transfers vanishes. We argue that these mechanisms have 
important implications for the ongoing debates over comprehensive immigration reform in the 
US and elsewhere. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  F22, I2, J62 
  





Francesc Ortega  
Department of Economics and Business 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27 
Barcelona, 08005 
Spain 
E-mail: francesc.ortega@upf.edu   
 1 Introduction
\Many immigrants tend to be fairly apolitical, are often slow to naturalize, and are
more concerned with problems of day-to-day survival and their children's chances of
upward mobility than with engagement in American politics.1 Nonetheless, I suggest
that the children and grandchildren of the immigrants who arrived during the age of
migration from 1880 to 1924 played a major, if not a decisive, role in twentieth-century
American politics. In particular, I suggest that their inuence tipped the political
balance that led to the creation of the modern welfare state in the 1930s..." Charles
Hirschman (2001).
Twentieth century US history suggests that immigration played a crucial role in the politics
leading to the creation of the modern welfare state. The goal of this paper is to explore the role
that immigration will have on the future of the welfare state. More specically, we investigate
the political economy of income redistribution in an environment where immigration is the main
source of population growth. In each period, voters choose immigration and redistribution policies
by majority vote. Crucially, voters preferences over current policies are inuenced by their own
skills, their children's expected skill levels, and by the anticipated eects of immigration on future
domestic politics.
Let us briey comment on the main features of this environment. Immigration is the main
demographic force and the government is supposed to have the ability to control its size and skill
composition. In most rich countries natural population growth nowadays is low (or negative) and
overall population growth is mostly driven by immigration. In this context, the scal and political
implications of immigration are a very important policy issue. Obviously, governments ability to
control immigration ows is far from perfect. However, there is clear evidence that changes in
immigration policy have profound eects on immigration ows.2 Another important feature of our
environment is that voters' political views depend not only on their own current economic situation
but also on prospects of upward economic mobility. This is in line with the recent literature on
the political economy of redistribution (Benabou and Ok 2001, Alesina and La Ferrara 2004). In
our setup voters are foresighted and forecast the eects of current immigration policy on political
outcomes in the future.
The quotation above highlights the major role of second-generation immigrants in some of the
crucial US presidential elections over the past century. Clearly, this would not have been the case
had the children of immigrants not been able to obtain US citizenship and, consequently, the right
to vote. This highlights the crucial role of the institution of jus soli, by which children born in a
country automatically become citizens. In contrast, in jus sanguinis countries citizenship is passed
only by bloodline.3 Our model analyzes how voters' views are shaped by i) whether immigrants are
1Portes and Rumbaut 1996: chap 4; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001
2The characteristics of US and Canada immigrants over the last decade dier substantially. There is wide consensus
that it is due to dierences in the immigration policies of the two countries (Borjas, 1999). Ortega and Peri (2009)
show that immigration policy changes have large eects on the size of immigration ows for a large sample of OECD
countries.
3This is the case in Japan and was the case in Germany until 1999. See Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010) for an
excellent review of citizenship laws and an analysis of its evolution over time.
1allowed to stay in the country permanently or not, and ii) by whether their children are granted
citizenship in the host country or not. We compare the outcomes across immigration regimes,
hoping to shed light on the recent debates over immigration policy.4
The paper contains three main results. First, we show that the optimal policy entails admitting
skilled immigrants (to maximize income per capita) and redistributing income vigorously from rich
to poor. Second, we show the existence of a majority vote equilibrium with long-run redistribution
when immigrants stay permanently in the country and their children gain the right to vote (jus
soli). In the steady state, there is an unskilled majority that implements income redistribution.
In order to regenerate political support for redistribution the unskilled majority uses immigration
policy strategically, admitting a limited number of unskilled immigrants at each period. In contrast,
when immigrants do not vote, either because of a limited stay or due to legal constraints, there is
no equilibrium where redistribution can be sustained in steady state. Finally, we show that income
redistribution is not politically sustainable when immigrants do not vote.
The key insight of the model is that when immigration is permanent and citizenship is granted
by jus soli, voters face an inter-temporal trade-o. Unskilled (poor) voters are in favor of unskilled
immigration because it increases the political support for redistribution in the future. But this
comes at the cost of lower current unskilled wages. As a result, the unskilled majority admits only
the unskilled immigration needed to oset the rising share of skilled voters in the economy. However,
when immigrants do not vote, either because their stay is temporary or because of jus sanguinis, the
trade-o disappears and unskilled majorities choose to admit only skilled immigrants. Eventually,
the dynamics of the skill distribution lead to a skilled majority that abandons redistribution.
The strategic use of immigration policy featured in the equilibrium helps explain a puzzling
observation. Over the last decade, the Democratic party in the US and left-wing parties in several
European countries (such as France, Italy, Spain and the UK) have been substantially more pro-
immigration than the parties on the right side of the political spectrum. Perhaps even more puzzling
is the pro-immigration stance that labor unions have taken in these countries, supporting the right
of immigrants to become citizens and to vote. The following quotation nicely illustrates this point
in the US context. \Organized labor is looking to Mexico to advance its call for amnesty for the
more than ve million illegal immigrants, a position that the A.F.L.-C.I.O. adopted last year after
decades of hostility to illegal immigrants. But unions are now reaching out to immigrants, seeing
them as a source of growth and energy, rather than a threat (New York Times, July 19, 2001)." In
the light of the key trade-o in our model, these observations can be easily accounted for.
Our paper is closely related to four strands of literature. First, our work contributes to the
literature studying the dynamics of government. Within this body of research, our paper is most
related to the recent dynamic political economy models. The approach in Krusell, Quadrini and
Rios-Rull (1997) and Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999) requires heavy use of numerical methods and
has a quantitative focus. The model I present is more in line with Hassler et al (2002, 2005), who
employ more stylized models that can be solved analytically. Demographics (and immigration in
4Oering a track to citizenship for immigrants and their children is a highly controversial issue in the current
political debate over comprehensive immigration policy reform in the US. The decade-long discussion has been stalked
due to sharp political disagreement on whether a track to permanent residence, ultimately leading to citizenship,
should be oered. While most Democrats support it, a large fraction of the Republican party ercely opposes it.
2particular) are absent in these studies. Hassler et al (2002) nd that there are multiple equilibria
when policies are adopted by majority vote. Positive steady-state redistribution takes place in some
equilibria but not in others. Another set of papers studies the eect of exogenous immigration
ows on the evolution of the public sector. The papers here have a strong quantitative emphasis.
Storeslestten (2000) takes scal policies as given and quanties the eects of immigration on US
public nances using a dynamic, general equilibrium model. Canova and Ravn (2000) analyze the
eects of German unication in a dynamic model where redistributive transfers are a deterministic
function of immigration ows.
Secondly, our work is also related to the literature on the political economy of redistribution,
pioneered by Metzler and Richard (1981). Recently, several authors have developed models linking
immigration and income redistribution. Typically, these are static models where redistribution is
endogenously determined and immigration is taken as exogenous, as in Razin, Sadka and Swagel
(2002). Roemer and Van der Straeten (2006) study the consequences of the rise in xenophobia (in
Denmark) on the size of the welfare state. The analysis in Dolmas and Human (2004) features both
endogenous immigration and redistribution policies. These authors propose a three-period model.
In the rst period, a capital-heterogeneous native population makes consumption-saving decisions
and votes over immigration policy. In the second period, the native population and the enfranchised
immigrants make saving decisions and vote over next period's degree of income redistribution. In
the third period, all individuals simply consume their respective after-redistribution incomes. One
obvious dierence is that prospects of upward economic mobility play a central role in shaping
individual policy preferences in our model but are absent in their analysis. More substantively,
the two models dier in several predictions. First, in Dolmas and Human (2004) admitting poor
immigrants that can vote does not necessarily imply higher redistribution. In fact, under some
conditions, it may even lead to a lower tax rate.5 In contrast, in our model, an increase in the
number of unskilled immigrants with the right to vote unambiguously increases political support for
redistribution. The key dierence between the two models is the degree of individual heterogeneity
in wealth levels. In our highly stylized model there are only two types of voters and each type has
a unique preferred tax rate. Second, under perfect capital mobility immigration has no eects on
factor prices in Dolmas and Human (2004), where only one type of labor is considered. In contrast,
we assume that skilled and unskilled labor are not perfect substitutes. As a result, immigration
ows that aect the economy's skill composition will induce persistent changes in the skill premium.
Finally, the model developed in Dolmas and Human (2004) predicts that when immigrants are not
allowed to vote, support for increasing immigration levels rises. In a sense, our model delivers the
opposite prediction. In our main equilibrium (under permanent immigration and jus soli), there are
binding quotas on unskilled immigration. In contrast, when immigrants do not vote, immigration
policy in steady state entails larger unskilled inows, only restricted by the availability of potential
immigrants.
Third, our work is also related to the recent literature on the political economy of immigration.
This literature was pioneered by Benhabib (1996), who builds a static model where agents with het-
erogeneous capital holdings choose immigration policy by majority vote. His model abstracts from
income redistribution. Ortega (2005) provides an innite-horizon extension of Benhabib (1996),
5For a similar result, see Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002).
3where he shows that a stationary equilibrium exists and argues that it accounts better for the
recent US immigration experience. The model we introduce here extends Ortega (2005) in several
directions. First and foremost, voters choose the degree of income redistribution in addition to
immigration policy. Redistributive taxation fundamentally alters the link between immigration
ows and individual consumption, which changes voters' views on immigration policy. Introducing
redistribution also helps explain why immigration is such a politically salient topic even though the
empirical literature strongly suggests that immigration has practically no eect on wages.6 Finally,
the dynamics in the model we present are much richer than in Ortega (2005).
Finally, our paper is also related to club theory and to the literature on the extension of citizen-
ship and franchise. Conceptually, choosing an immigration policy is akin to deciding on admission
to a club. Roberts (2007) and Barbera, Maschler and Shalev (2001) study dynamic games where
current club members vote over new membership. In their analysis voters' preferences are exoge-
nously dened over the composition of the club. Our model is much simpler in many respects but
features general equilibrium eects on wages. Interestingly, Barbera, Maschler and Shalev (2001)
nd that some voters sometimes engage in a strategic use of admission policy, admitting individ-
uals that reduce their current payo in anticipation that the new comers will provide support for
desirable policies in the future. They refer to this behavior as \voting for your enemy". Another
important contribution to this literature is Jehiel and Scotchmer (2001). These authors build a
static model with multiple locations and heterogeneous individuals in their taste for public goods.
The timing of choices is sequential, with individuals in each location collectively deciding on ad-
mission (immigration policy), taking into account that all individuals in a location will vote over
the public good. The fundamental trade-o in the model is the following. Immigrants reduce the
per-capita cost of the public good but potentially change the identity of the median voter that
will decide on the size of the public good. The authors consider several constitutional arrange-
ments regarding the collective admission of immigrants, ranging from free migration to admission
by majority vote or by unanimity. An interesting empirical counterpart to the papers above is
Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010). These authors assemble a large, comprehensive cross-country panel
of citizenship laws. They estimate the determinants of whether a country grants citizenship based
on bloodline (jus sanguinis), on birth place (jus soli), or has a mixed regime. Their ndings suggest
strong persistence in citizenship laws over time. Finally, choosing admission into a club has similar
political economy implications as deciding on franchise extension. Important contributions to this
question are Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Lizzeri and Persico (2003). More recently, Jack
and Laguno (2005) explore franchise extension in a dynamic environment.
The plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterizes
the optimal policy. Section 4 turns to political (voting) equilibria under permanent migration when
citizenship is passed according to jus soli. Section 5 analyzes the two immigration regimes where
immigrants do not vote. Section 6 discusses some of the main assumptions and sketches a number
of extensions. Figures and proofs are located in the appendix.
6See, for instance, Card (2001,2005) and Lewis (2003).
42 Model
Consider an economy where one nal good is produced by a competitive rm using two complemen-
tary inputs: skilled and unskilled labor. Let F(L1;L2) be the production function, a continuous,
smooth and constant-returns-to-scale function satisfying the following standard properties: Fi > 0,
Fii < 0 for i = 1;2 and F12 > 0.7 Let us dene the skilled-unskilled ratio by k = L2=L1. It is
straightforward to check that F1(1;k) is a strictly increasing function of k and F2(1;k) is a strictly
decreasing function of k. The respective derivatives (with respect to k) are F12 > 0 and F22 < 0.
To save on notation I will use Fi(k) to denote Fi(1;k), for i = 1;2:
The economy is populated by many agents, with one of either two skill levels. Unskilled agents
will be denoted by i = 1 and skilled agents by i = 2: These workers can be either natives (born
in the country) or immigrants (foreign-born). All agents supply one unit of labor inelastically and





where u is an increasing, strictly concave, and continuous function. I will interpret these pref-
erences in a dynastic sense. So ct denotes the consumption of a worker at time t, ct+1 her only
child's consumption and  2 [0;1) is the degree of altruism between parents and children. The
expectation refers to uncertainty about the skill level of the ospring. We abstract from bequests.
In every period, the government redistributes income from the rich to the poor by means of a
proportional income tax rt and a universal transfer bt. Thus the individual budget constraint is
given by
cit = (1   rt)wit + bt; (1)
where wit is the wage for an individual of skill type i in period t. For now, let us assume that
taxes are non-distortionary and that feasible tax rates range between 0 and r  1.8 We assume
that the government runs a balanced budget in each period and that immigrants also pay taxes
and receive transfers.9
7It is easy to show that this production function can be interpreted as the reduced-form of a more general function
with three inputs (skilled labor, unskilled labor and physical capital), provided the economy faces a perfectly elastic
supply of capital. Ortega and Peri (2009) provide empirical evidence supporting that immigration shocks lead to a
rapid proportional expansion of the capital stock in the receiving economy. In the absence of capital dilution the only
persistent eect of immigration on factors of production is a change in the skill composition of the labor force.
8Section 6 shows that r = 1 corresponds to the case of non-distortionary taxation whereas r < 1 is the reduced
form of a model where the labor supply of skilled (rich) workers is distorted by taxation.
9We are abstracting from intergenerational redistribution. Several authors have analyzed the use of immigration
policy as a tool to remedy the forecasted decits in social security. Available estimates suggest a roughly neutral
eect of immigration, once general equilibrium eects are taken into account (Storesletten 2000, Fehr, Jokisch and
Kotliko 2005). Thus it seems reasonable to leave intergenerational redistribution out of the current analysis.
52.1 Competitive equilibrium given exogenous policies
I assume that, given an arbitrary sequence of immigration and redistribution policies, prices and
allocations follow a competitive equilibrium. Under the assumptions above, the equilibrium alloca-
tion in each period can be written as a function of the period's after-immigration skilled-unskilled
ratio (kt) and income tax rate (rt). Namely, individual consumption is given by
ci(kt;rt) = Fi(kt) + rt (f(kt)   Fi(kt)) (2)
= (1   rt)Fi(kt) + rtf(kt), for i = 1;2; (3)
where f(kt) denotes output per worker, Y=(L1 + L2), and we have imposed a balanced govern-
ment budget in each period. It is immediate to show that f(k) is increasing as long as F1(k) < F2(k):
Below we shall introduce an assumption that will guarantee that skilled workers will always have
a higher marginal product (and thus higher income) than unskilled ones.10
Let us now dene the indirect utility functions over policies by
vi(kt;rt) = u[ci(kt;rt)], for i = 1;2: (4)
These functions will be the one-period payo functions of the dynastic voting model. Obviously,
these functions inherit the properties of ci(kt;rt). In particular, note that v1(kt;rt) is increasing in
(kt) since it is the sum of two functions that are increasing in the skilled-unskilled ratio.11 Note
also that when the tax rate is zero v2(kt;rt) is decreasing in kt since c2t = F2(kt).
2.2 Intergenerational Mobility
We are interested in economies experiencing human capital accumulation in the form of a growing
share of skilled workers. A convenient modelling device is to assume that the skill distribution of
the labor force is governed by a two-state Markov chain. That is, children's skills are stochastic but
depend on the skills (income level) of their parents. Therefore prospects of economic mobility will
inuence voters' views on income redistribution (as in Benabou and Ok 2001) and on immigration
policy (as in Ortega 2005).12
More specically, let pi be the probability of being skilled given parental skill level i. We
shall restrict the mobility process in two realistic ways. First, we shall assume intergenerational
persistence, so that children are more likely to be of the same type as their parents than not. This
is condition (5) below. We shall also assume upward mobility, given by condition (6). That is
to say, the probability that an unskilled parent has a skilled child (upgrading) is higher than the
10Appendix 2 contains some useful properties of function f(k), which are used extensively in the proofs.
11Recall that we shall restrict to values of kt such that F1(k) < F2(k).
12This is the main reason why we only allow for two skill levels. Existence of a Condorcet winner cannot be
guaranteed when more than two types of voters choose among multidimensional policy vectors. Applications where
a Condorcet winner can be shown to exist rely on restricted forms of heterogeneity in individual policy preferences.
In our setup individual policy preferences are complicated objects since we have altruistic voters with stochastic skill
levels (in a dynastic sense).





p1 > 1   p2: (6)
For the sake of simplicity we also assume that the skills of the children of natives and immi-
grants are both described by the same Markov chain.14 Let us discuss briey conditions (5) and
(6). Imposing intergenerational persistence is a very reasonable assumption, given its strong em-
pirical support. Virtually in all countries, the data show a robust, positive correlation between the
educational attainment of parents and children.15 The upward mobility condition ensures that the
voting problem is non-trivial in all periods. We discuss this point in Section 2.4, where we also show
that it can be relaxed. Three more observations are worth noting. First, the two conditions are not
mutually exclusive. Second, observe that the case of no mobility (full persistence), p1 = 1 p2 = 0,
is a particular case satisfying both conditions.16 Third, realistic parameter values feature both
intergenerational persistence and upward mobility. Appendix 1 provides my own estimates based
on US individual-level data (General Social Survey). Mobility parameters p1 = 0:37 and p2 = 0:83
are precisely estimated and satisfy both conditions. Moreover, we obtain very similar estimates for
the children of natives and for the children of immigrants.
2.3 Immigration and citizenship regimes
As in any political economy model, an important ingredient is the institutional background deter-
mining who can vote. We shall consider three regimes.17 The rst regime will be referred to as
temporary migration. Here we assume that immigrants arrive in the country to work. At the end of
the period they leave and have children only after they have left the country. The next two regimes
involve permanent migration: immigrants participate in the labor market and at the end of their
working lives have children. According to our second regime, jus soli, the children of immigrants
are considered citizens with full rights and obligations, including the right to vote.18 In the third
regime, jus sanguinis, citizenship is solely acquired by bloodline. Thus, the children of immigrants
13In a more general environment skill accumulation would be a conscious investment aected by the market returns
to education, income tax rates, family background, and so on. The process specied here can be seen as a reduced
form that is both analytically convenient and relatively general at the same time. Section 6.2 sketches an extension
of the model with endogenous skill investment.
14Intergenerational mobility in education varies by ethnicity but, on average, it is very similar to the mobility rates
for natives. See Card (2005) and my own estimates in Appendix 1 for estimates based on US data.
15The reasons behind this correlation are more debatable, ranging from hereditary transmission of ability, to
nurturing dierences by education of the parents, or the presence of tight credit constraints in education nancing.
16Consider the (p1;p2) in the [0;1][0;1] space. Intergenerational persistence constrains values in the square with
corners (0,0.5), (0.5,0.5), (0,1), (0.5,1), that is, the top-left region. Upward mobility denes the region above the
diagonal connecting points (0,1) and (1,0). Clearly, the intersection of the two regions is non-empty.
17In reality there are many mixed regimes, which combine features of the three canonical regimes considered here.
See Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010) for more details.
18In the context of our model it is irrelevant if the rst-generation immigrants are given the right to vote, since all
relevant policies in the period have already been chosen. The quotation in page 1 suggests that the political inuence
of the second generation is much larger than that of their parents.
7stay in the country and work in the next period but do not have the right to vote. From a political
economy perspective, regimes one (temporary migration) and three (permanent migration with jus
sanguinis) have very similar implications. We shall refer to these two regimes collectively as the
case where immigrants do not vote. In one case this is because they have already left the country.
In the other it is because of legal constraints.
Let us now describe the laws of motion for the electorate and the labor force in each of the
three regimes. Let the current population be denoted by vector
(N1(t);N2(t);J1(t);J2(t);I1(t);I2(t)); (7)
where, for skill level i, Ni(t) denotes native-born individuals with citizenship, Ji(t) denotes
native-born individuals without citizenship, and Ii(t) denotes foreign-born individuals. The num-
bers of native-born individuals, with or without citizenship, are predetermined variables whereas
the number of foreign-born individuals currently in the labor force, Ii(t), is an outcome of the
current immigration policy. In all three regimes, the labor force is composed of all three groups of
individuals. That is,
Li(t) = Ni(t) + Ji(t) + Ii(t): (8)
In the regimes where immigrants do not vote (temporary migration or permanent migration





























where Li(t) denotes the number of individuals in the labor force with skill level i. In words,
all children born in the country are considered citizens, regardless of the status of the parents.
Moreover, in subsequent periods all native-born individuals will be citizens under the jus soli
regime. That is, Ji(t + k) = 0 for all k > 0.
For the remainder it will be very useful to dene the skilled to unskilled ratio among the voting





Variable nt will be the main state variable in the dynamic voting problem. It is straightforward
to show that under the jus soli regime the law of motion for nt can be written solely as a function
of the skilled-unskilled ratio in the labor force (kt) and the mobility parameters:
nt+1 = M(kt;p1;p2) =
p1 + p2kt
1   p1 + kt(1   p2)
: (11)
8Mobility function M maps the skills of the current adult population (the parents) to the skills
of the native population with voting rights in the next period (their children). In the regimes
where immigrants do not vote the law of motion for nt is simpler: nt+1 = M(nt;p1;p2). That is,
only the children of citizens are citizens. Some properties of mobility function M will be helpful
in our analysis. First, we note that under full persistence (p1 = 1   p2 = 0) the mobility function
reduces to the identity function. In words, the share of skilled voters next period is equal to the
current period's. Secondly, it is straightforward to verify that, as a function of k, M is increasing
and strictly concave.19 Figure 1a depics mobility function M using the probabilities estimated in
Appendix 1.
2.4 Evolution of skills in autarky
It is helpful to examine the dynamics of the skill composition in the absence of immigration (au-
tarky). Obviously, in this case, the before and after migration skilled-unskilled ratios coincide:
kt = nt at all periods. As a result, law of motion (11) can be written as nt+1 = M(nt). A bit of





which is increasing in p1 and p2. By denition, at steady state na the skilled-unskilled ows
(downgrading) balance out with the unskilled-skilled ows (upgrading). We also note that the
assumption of upward mobility, condition (6), implies that at steady state there is a skilled majority,
that is, na > 1.
Let us now illustrate the equilibrium transition (in autarky) from an initial condition, n0, to the
autarky steady state na. Let us assume that at some initial period skilled workers are scarce, that
is, n0 is close to zero. As illustrated by Figure 1a, transition function M(nt) is increasing. Thus,
period 1's skilled-unskilled ratio is larger than period 0's: n1 = M(n0) > n0: Clearly, the sequence
of skilled-unskilled ratios along the autarky equilibrium path, fntg, is increasing and converges to
steady-state ratio na. Along the path, skill (and income) inequality fall over time. This behavior
is appealing because it mimics, in a very simple way, the evolution of the skill distribution in the
US and other developed countries in the postwar period. The fraction of skilled (college-graduate)
individuals in the population increased monotonically until reaching a plateau in the last decade.
Our model takes these reasonably realistic skill dynamics as given and concentrates in the political
economy implications.
By virtue of our upward mobility assumption, the initial unskilled majority n0 < 1 eventually
switches to a situation where the skilled population becomes the majority. This switch in majority
is what renders the dynamic voting problem interesting. If we assumed, instead, p1 < 1   p2,
dynamic considerations would play no role in voters' minds.20




20As discussed in Appendix 1, our upward mobility assumption is realistic. However, it is easy to relax by adding
an additional parameter to the model. Suppose, for instance, that all skilled citizens vote. However, the turnout rate
9Figure 1a plots the mobility function in autarky, that is, with kt = nt for all periods t. For
reasons that will become clear later, Figure 1b plots inverse function kt = M 1(nt+1) under the
assumption that the children of immigrants become citizens. Thus we have current after-migration
skilled-unskilled ratios (kt) in the vertical axis and next period's native ratios (nt+1) in the horizontal
axis. Let us now consider a current skilled-unskilled ratio in the labor force below the autarky steady
state, say, kt = 1. Moving horizontally across the Figure, upward mobility implies nt+1 = M(1) > 1,
that is, the system transitions from an equal number of skilled and unskilled individuals to a
majority of skilled natives in the next period. Finally, it will be useful to dene after-migration
ratio  as the value that leads to a a balanced population in terms of skills in the next period:
M() = 1: (13)
It follows easily from (11) that  = (1   2p1)=(2p2   1) and  < 1. This ratio will play an
important role when policies are determined by majority vote as it entails a tie in the election.
2.5 The supply of immigrants
At any point in time, the skill distribution of the voting population is fully characterized by the
skilled-to-unskilled ratio nt. By choosing immigration policy, we can vary the skill composition
of the labor force, kt, which determines wages and individual consumption levels. Naturally, our
choices are constrained by the availability of potential immigrants.
A convenient way to model the supply of immigrants is the following. Given pre-migration ratio
nt, the set of feasible after-migration ratios kt will be given by
kt 2 [a(n);b(n)]; (14)
where functions a(n);b(n) are continuous, increasing, and satisfy a(n)  n  b(n). Thus, by
admitting all available unskilled immigrants (and no skilled ones) current wages would be deter-
mined by ratio k = a(n). Conversely, admitting only skilled immigrants would deliver a ratio b(n).
Obviously, any intermediate ratio can be attained by admitting appropriate numbers of immigrants
of either type.21 With this exible formulation, it is easy to analyze dierent cases regarding the
set of feasible immigration policies. Most countries face an asymmetric supply of immigrants, that
is, the availability of unskilled immigrants is much larger than the availability of unskilled ones. In
the extreme case where only unskilled immigrants are available the choice set would be given by
[a(n);n]. To be more specic, consider the set of choices for the US and Canada. Both countries
are similar in terms of their ability to attract foreign talent (skilled workers). However, the US
shares a border with Mexico. As a result, while both the US and Canada might be considered as
having the same b(n) function, it may be more appropriate to assume that function a(n) for the
for unskilled voters is less than one. In this case, even if the number of skilled citizens at any given time is lower
than the number of unskilled ones, eectively the decisive voter might still be skilled. As a result, we could have a
switch in the political majority despite n
a < 1. Gaps in turnout rates by education are well documented. In the 2008
US presidential election, 70 percent of all young voters (under age 30) had gone to college whereas just 57 percent of
young U.S. citizens had attended college (2008 CIRCLE Youth Voting Trends).
21In general, several vectors of immigrants (I1;I2) will deliver a given ratio k given a value for n.
10US is below the analogous function for Canada. As we shall see soon, the characteristics of this set
are crucial for the determination of equilibrium policies.
Figure 2 plots the supply of immigrants. Consider, for example, state n = 1. As drawn in the
Figure, by choosing the appropriate immigration policy it is feasible to increase the skilled-unskilled
ratio a little bit but it is possible to reduce it substantially. We shall say that (current) immigration
is unskilled when nt > kt; that is when the after-immigration skilled-to-unskilled ratio is lower than
the ratio among natives only. Likewise, we shall say that immigration is skilled when nt < kt.
3 Optimal policies
Prior to introducing political competition, it is helpful to study the case where policies are chosen
by a benevolent government. This allows us to illustrate how beliefs about future policies are
formed. We consider the policy choices of a government that cares about the dynastic utility of
the native population at each point in time. For simplicity, we assume that all children born in the
country are treated equally by the government (jus soli).22 The social welfare function is a time-
varying average over the population, where the weights need to vary because of the changing skill
composition of the population. These changes are due both to immigration and to intergenerational
mobility. The government lacks commitment and needs to forecast how current choices aect the
future skill composition in the population.
Let us rst consider the simpler static problem faced by the government. Given native popula-










where n = N2=N1, k 2 [a(n);b(n)] and r 2 [0;r].
The solution to this problem is a simple one. It entails maximum redistribution and skilled
immigration at each state, that is, (k;r) = (b(n);r). Let us show why this is the case. After some











At (k;r) = (b(n);r) both conditions are strictly positive. However, it is not feasible to increase
any of the two variables as we are hitting the constraint. Intuitively, the benevolent government
uses immigration policy to attain the highest possible income per capita. Since skilled workers
have a higher marginal product than unskilled ones, this implies admitting skilled immigrants only.
Next it uses taxes to reduce the gap between the marginal utilities of consumption of the two types
of workers. This is done by taxing the rich (skilled) as much as possible.
22Thus J1(t) = J2(t) = 0
11As we show in the next proposition, the static solution is also the solution to the full-edged
dynamic optimal policy problem. We rst need to provide a formal denition of optimal policy.
Technically, the main diculty lies in modelling voters' beliefs about the future consequences of
current policies.23 Let beliefs about future policies be given by a policy function, that is, a pair of
functions (K;R) : [n;n] ! R2
+ that maps the skilled-to-unskilled ratio (n) in each period to a pair of
policies. Given these beliefs about future policies, at each period the government chooses current
policies to maximize the average (dynastic) welfare of the native population. Let the dynastic
utility of a worker of skill type i be given by Vi(n), for i = 1;2. And let us dene the set of feasible
policies by  (n) = [a(n);b(n)][0;r]. We can now provide a formal denition of an optimal policy.
Denition 1. An optimal policy is a policy rule (K;R) : [n;n] ! R2
+ and associated continua-
tion values (V1;V2) : [n;n] ! R2 such that
i) Given policy rule (K;R) continuation values (V1;V2) satisfy
V1(n) = v1(K(n);R(n)) + C1(MK(n))
V2(n) = v2(K(n);R(n)) + C2(MK(n));
for all n 2 [n;n], where
Ci(n) = (1   pi)V1(n) + piV2(n)
is the expected utility of the child before her skill type has been determined.
ii) Given continuation values (V1;V2), policy rule (K;R) satises
(K(n);R(n)) 2 arg max
(k;r)2 (n)
v1(k;r) + C1(Mk) + n[v2(k;r) + C2(Mk)]
1 + n
:
The rst part of the denition simply states that beliefs about the future are determined by the
policy rule and the probability distribution over the skills of the ospring. The second part says
that the policies are chosen in each period to maximize the average dynastic utility of the native
population in that period.
The following proposition (proved in the appendix) describes the optimal policy.24
Proposition 1. The optimal policy entails admitting all available skilled immigrants and maxi-
mum redistribution in each state. Specically, the associated policy rule is (K(n);R(n)) = (b(n);r)
for all n. Moreover, the economy converges to a steady state n = M(K(n)). At steady state,
there is maximum redistribution.
In a nutshell, it is optimal in every period to admit all skilled applicants to maximize income
per capita and then engage in vigorous income redistribution to reduce the gap in marginal utilities
of consuption. We note the tension between maintaining heavy income redistribution and an
increasing share of skilled workers in the economy. The main purpose of the sections that follow
is to determine immigration and income redistribution when these policies are chosen by majority
vote.
23For the remainder of the paper we assume that F2(n)  F1(n). That is, skilled workers are always richer than
unskilled ones.
24As can be seen in the proof, we require the maximum tax rate (r) to be close to one.
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We now turn to the more interesting case where policies are determined democratically by fore-
sighted voters. We assume that immigrants and their ospring stay in the country permanently.
On arrival immigrants can work but cannot vote. However, their children will be considered citizens
with the right to vote (jus soli). This creates a link between current immigration ows and future
policies. Altruistic voters that care about their children's welfare need to anticipate the eects of
current choices on future domestic politics.
4.1 Static policy preferences
It is helpful to begin by analyzing voters' static preferences over immigration and redistribution.
Recall that the indirect utility functions dened over current policies are given by vi(kt;rt) =
u[ci(kt;rt)] where
ci(kt;rt) = (1   rt)Fi(kt) + rtf(kt);for i = 1;2: (18)
That is, consumption is a convex combination of the own wage and output per worker, with the
weight on the own wage given by the tax rate. Static policy preferences are very intuitive. Unskilled
workers support maximum redistribution (since their wage is always lower than output per worker)
and skilled immigration (since that increases output per worker). Thus, their static preferred policy
pair is (k1;r1) = (b(n);r). Conversely, skilled workers' statically preferred policies are (k2;r2) =
(a(n);0), namely, zero redistribution and unskilled immigration. A trivial dynamic extension of
this model, where voters are myopic, would be fully described by these policy preferences, law of
motion nt+1 = M(kt), and the rule of majority. That is, at each period the adopted policy pair
would be the one preferred by the largest group.25
4.2 Denition of equilibrium
We now turn to the more complicated case, where voters care about the eect of current policies on
the welfare of their ospring, taking into account intergenerational mobility in skills (and income).
Formally, the problem is a dynamic game with a state variable that summarizes the skill distribution
of the electorate at each point in time. As common in the dynamic political economy literature, I
restrict attention to stationary (Markov perfect) voting equilibria, where the state variable is the
skilled-to-unskilled ratio in the native population. Voters' beliefs about future policies are given by
a time-invariant (policy) function of the state variable. Taking the function as given, each voter is
assumed to vote for her preferred policy pair. In each state, the policy proposed by the majority
of voters is adopted. In the event of a tie, that is when there is an equal number of voters of each
type, I assume that the party that decided policies in the last period can do so again. Formally,
dene state n = 1  as the tie where unskilled voters decide current policies. Likewise, let state
n = 1+ denote the tie where skilled voters decide current policies. State variable nt determines
25The myopic voters case is reminiscent of Benhabib (1996), which analyzes a model of immigration policy (without
redistribution or mobility in skills). A simple dynamic extension of his model gives rise to immigration policy cycles.
13which party is in the majority as well as the set of feasible policies.26
So far we have considered state space [n;n]. Some states in this set are relatively trivial, in the
sense that next period's majority is independent from the current choice of policies. Recall that
we dened earlier  as the current after-migration ratio that leads to a tie in next period's vote
(equation (13) and Figure 1), that is, nt+1 = M() = 1. Clearly, when the current state is such
that there is an overwhelming unskilled majority among voters, even admitting only high skilled
immigrants the majority in the next period will remain unskilled. Specically, when nt  b 1()
then nt+1 = M(b(nt))  M() = 1. Similarly, in states with an overwhelming skilled majority,
nt  a 1(), there will again be a skilled majority in the next period regardless of the immigration
policy currently chosen. For these trivial states I shall assume that parties choose policies according
to static considerations: unskilled majorities are assumed to choose (K(n);R(n)) = (b(n);r) and
skilled majorities are assumed to choose (a(n);0).27 In the remainder we need to characterize the







Observe that, by construction, for all states n 2 
 it is the case that a(n) <  < b(n). In
words, among current feasible immigration policies some give rise to an unskilled majority in the
next period while others give rise to a skilled majority. That is, there are non-trivial political
consequences from today's policy choices. Figure 2 illustrates the non-trivial state space.
Let us provide a formal denition of a majority vote equilibrium under permanent immigration
and jus soli.
Denition 2. A majority vote equilibrium with permanent migration and jus soli is a policy
rule (K;R) : 
 ! R2
+ and a pair of value functions (V1;V2) such that:
i) Given (K;R), continuation values are given by
Vi(n) = vi (K(n);R(n)) + [(1   pi)V1(M(K(n))) + piV2(M(K(n)))]
= vi (K(n);R(n)) + Ci(M(K(n))); for all n 2 
 and i = 1;2:
ii) In all unskilled majority states, n  1 ;
(K(n);R(n)) 2 arg max
(k;r)2 (n)
v1(k;r) + C1(M(k));
iii) and in all skilled majority states, n  1+;
(K(n);R(n)) 2 arg max
(k;r)2 (n)
v2(k;r) + C2(M(k));
26An alternative to majority vote is probabilistic voting (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987), which is increasingly used
in macroeconomic models with political economy (as in Hassler et al 2005). The reason is that the solution to the
probabilistic voting problem can be found by analyzing a relatively simple social planning problem with a utilitarian
welfare function. This is also the case here. In our model the equilibrium policy rule under probabilistic voting
coincides exactly with the optimal policy studied in Section 3.
27This restriction of the state space is without loss of generality as long as we restrict to stationary equilibria with
state variable nt.
14where  (n) = [a(n);b(n)]  [0;r].
The rst point in the denition describes how voters' beliefs about the future are formed in a
consistent manner. This is just like in the optimal policy problem of the previous section. The
second point states that in states with an unskilled majority, n  1 , policies are chosen by
unskilled voters, taking into account the consequences of current choices for the utility of their
ospring. Analogously, the third point states that skilled voters choose policies in states with a
skilled majority.28
4.3 Long-run redistribution
It is worth recalling that under the assumptions that we made earlier on the intergenerational
mobility process, in autarky (that is, in the absence of immigration) the economy converges to
a skilled majority. As we saw earlier, a benevolent government would redistribute income in all
periods. The purpose of this section is to investigate whether, under the same stochastic process
for skills, income redistribution is politically sustainable when policies are chosen by majority vote.
We show below that, quite intuitively, a skilled majority will never choose to redistribute income
toward the poor. Thus the sustainability of redistributive policies requires an unskilled majority to
use immigration policy to stabilize the skill distribution of the voting population at a point where
they hold the decision power. Namely, it has to be the case that the consequences of redistribution
being terminated are bad enough for unskilled voters so as to induce an unskilled majority to admit
unskilled immigrants.
A full characterization of the whole set of equilibria in dynamic games is often dicult. This
is also the case here. Thus our strategy will be to provide sucient conditions for the existence
of an equilibrium where redistribution is politically sustainable in steady state. Our rst result,
proved in the appendix, states that voters' views over redistributive policies coincide with their
static preferences.
Lemma 1. In any majority vote equilibrium with permanent migration and jus soli
R(n) =

r if n  1 
0 if n  1+:
Recall that a policy rule (K;R) has a steady state n if M(K(n)) = n. Clearly, Lemma 1
implies that there can be redistribution in steady state if and only if there is an unskilled majority.
Therefore a necessary condition for an equilibrium with long run redistribution is a relatively
abundant supply of unskilled immigrants.29
28This denition of a politico-economic equilibrium has been used in numerous recent papers. Krusell, Quadrini
and Rios-Rull (1997) and Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999) provide numerical solutions for a richer environment. Hassler
et al (2002, 2005) and Jack and Laguno (2005) have provided analytical solutions for more stylized environments.
29Specically, we shall assume that a(1)  . In words, we are assuming that when the skilled-unskilled ratio among
voters equals one, it is feasible to admit enough unskilled immigrants so that the after-migration skilled-unskilled
ratio is equal to  or lower.
15Consider policy rule (K;R) : 
 ! R2 such that
(K(n);R(n)) =

(;r) if n  1 
(;0) if n  1+ : (20)
In unskilled majority states the policy rule species full redistribution and k = , the skilled
ratio that allows unskilled voters to retain the majority while delivering the highest feasible unskilled
consumption. In skilled majority states, the rule species no redistribution and again k = , which
delivers the highest possible skilled consumption while maintaining a skilled majority. Note that
this policy rule features two steady states: one with redistribution, n = 1 ; and one without,
n = 1+. Given an initial unskilled majority, under the policy rule income redistribution will be
sustained indenitely.30 Figures 3a and 3b depict policy rule K(n) and R(n), respectively. Over
state space 
, K(n) =  is constant. We can also see the values of the policy rule for the trivial
states. Namely, for n  
, the unskilled majority admits skilled immigrants, K(n) = b(n), and
redistributes income. For n  
, the skilled majority admits unskilled immigrants, K(n) = a(n),
and sets the tax rate to zero. Clearly, regardless of the initial condition the economy eventually
enters state space 
. Turning to Figure 3b, an unskilled majority chooses maximum redistribution
(R(n) = r) whenever in the majority. Likewise, a skilled majority chooses minimum redistribution
(R(n) = 0) whenever in oce.
The following proposition states that this policy can indeed be a majority vote equilibrium under
some restrictions on parameter values. The following two assumptions are sucient conditions.
Assumption 1: v1(1;r) > (1   )v1(b(1);r) + u[F1(1)]:
Assumption 2: u[F2(1)] > (1   )u[F2(a(1))] + v2(1;r):
Assumptions 1 and 2 are easy to verify and, respectively, guarantee that unskilled and skilled
voters do not want to deviate from equilibrium policy (20). We shall provide the intuition for these
assumptions after stating the proposition.
Proposition 2. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If intergenerational persistence is high enough
for both types of voters, policy rule (20) is a majority vote equilibrium with permanent migration
and jus soli. Starting from n0 < 1, income redistribution takes place along the equilibrium path
and in steady state. Moreover, in steady state an unskilled majority admits a limited number of
unskilled immigrants period after period.
We rst describe the equilibrium and discuss its implications. Later on we shall provide the
basic intuition for the proof and the assumptions. Notice that in steady state, nt = 1 > kt = .
That is, there is unskilled immigration. Thus, starting from an initial unskilled majority, we
converge to a steady state where the unskilled majority admits unskilled immigrants. This entails
a sacrice in terms of current consumption in exchange for regenerating the political support for
redistributive policies. This behavior is reminiscent of the so-called voting for your enemy behavior
30For tractability we restrict to to equilibria with simple policy rules. In their analysis of the dynamics of govern-
ment, Hassler et al (2002, 2005) restrict to piece-wise linear policy rules.
16in the literature on dynamic club formation (Barbera, Maschler and Shalev, 2001). The proposition
provides a rationale for why sometimes left-wing parties support less restrictive immigration policies
than more conservative parties.
Let us now sketch the proof, which is fairly constructive. The details can be found in Appendix
3. The rst step is to compute the continuation equilibrium values. Given the simple structure of
the policy rule, this is a relatively easy task. Importantly, expected continuation value functions
Ci(n) are step functions with a discontinuity at the tie state. The second step is to check that there
are no protable one-period deviations. Consider the case of an unskilled voter in an unskilled
majority state. The conjectured policy rule suggests choosing (k;r) = (;r). This policy pair
clearly dominates any pair with k < . In all those cases, next period's majority would still be
unskilled. However, lower values of k imply lower current consumption. Among the immigration
policies that deliver a skilled majority in the next period, the one that dominates all the rest is
(k;r) = (b(n);r). This is the most tempting deviation as it provides the highest possible current
consumption. Assumption 1 ensures that this deviation is not protable for unskilled voters under
full intergenerational persistence. It requires the utility from no redistribution to be low enough,
compared to a constant consumption stream under maximum redistribution. Finally, a continu-
ity argument shows that there will not be protable deviations for high enough persistence. An
analogous argument applied to skilled voters in states of skilled majority leads to Assumption 2.
Clearly, Assumptions 1 and 2 require relatively high altruism () in order to induce voters to
choose policies that dier from their static best policies. In fact, when  = 0 both assumptions
fail (and when  = 1 both are satised). We also note that the characteristics of the supply
of immigrants play an important role. In particular, it is easy to check that if there were only
unskilled immigrants available (b(n) = n) then Assumption 1 holds for any  > 0. Intuitively,
unskilled voters have a very high incentive to retain the majority. In this case the equilibrium we
propose will hold for a larger region in the parameter space.
5 Political equilibrium when immigrants do not vote
Let us now turn to the two alternative immigration regimes. The rst regime, temporary migration,
is one where immigrants are forced to leave the country at the end of their working lives (and before
their children become citizens).31 The second regime is one where immigrants can remain perma-
nently in the country but citizenship is passed only by bloodline (jus sanguinis). The common,
crucial feature of both immigration regimes is that voters realize that current choices on immigra-
tion policy will not aect the skill distribution of voters in the next period. In the former regime,
the children of current immigrants do not vote because they (and their parents) have already left
the country. In the latter regime, legal constraints do not allow the children of immigrants to
vote. Clearly, under these two regimes voters' decision problems are now much simpler. The earlier
trade-o between the labor market eects of immigration and its political consequences has now
31Several countries have implemented temporary-migration policies. In the past hese programs have often been
unsuccessful in inducing return migration. Two notable examples are the Bracero program in the US in the 1950s
and Germany's gastarbeiterprogramm in the 1960s and 1970s. Nowadays the US and several other countries are
considering re-introducing temporary migration programs.
17disappeared.
Let us now dene an equilibrium when immigrants do not vote.
Denition 3. A majority vote equilibrium when immigrants do not vote is a policy rule (K;R) :

 ! R2
+ and a pair of value functions (V1;V2) such that:
i) Given (K;R); continuation values are given by
Vi(n) = vi (K(n);R(n)) + [(1   pi)V1(M(n)) + piV2(M(n))]
= vi (K(n);R(n)) + Ci(M(n)); for all n 2 
 and i = 1;2:
ii) In all unskilled majority states, n  1 ;
(K(n);R(n)) 2 arg max
(k;r)2 (n)
v1(k;r) + C1(M(n));
iii) and in all skilled majority states, n  1+;
(K(n);R(n)) 2 arg max
(k;r)2 (n)
v2(k;r) + C2(M(n));
where  (n) = [a(n);b(n)]  [0;r].32
The key observation is that when immigrants do not vote the evolution of the skills of the
electorate is independent from current policies. Specically, next period's electorate is given by
nt+1 = M(nt), rather than M(kt), as was the case under permanent migration with jus solis. Now
the evolution of the skill composition of the electorate is dictated by the exogenous mobility process:
nt+1 = M(nt) = Mt(n0);
which is not aected by the skill composition of the current the labor force fktg. Consequently,
the steady state distribution of voters when immigrants do not vote is given by the autarky steady-
state, na. It follows that voters' policy preferences coincide with their static best policy pairs. The
following result needs no proof.
Proposition 3. Suppose that nt+1 = M(nt), regardless of kt. The unique majority vote
equilibrium when immigrants do not vote is given by
(K(n);R(n)) =

(b(n);r) if n  1 
(a(n);0) if n  1+ ; (21)
which has a single steady state na =
p1
1 p2 > 1. At steady state there is a skilled majority and
no redistribution.
32The set of feasible policies under permanent migration with jus sanguinis cannot be expressed as a function of n
only. It requires information on the size and skill composition of the native-born, non-citizen population. Nevertheless
the equilibrium policy rule is the same as in the temporary migration regime.
18Two remarks are in order. First, we point out that the steady state is the same regardless
of whether immigrants do not vote because they only stay temporarily or because citizenship is
awarded purely on a jus sanguinis basis. However, the transition dynamics will dier because
of dierences in the set of feasible skilled-unskilled ratios. Second, we note that the long-run
sustainability of redistributive policies when immigrants do not vote is fully determined by the
parameters governing intergenerational mobility. Under our assumptions the majority of voters are
eventually skilled and redistribution abandoned.33 The crucial observation is that for parameters
values under which redistribution would be abandoned if immigrants did not vote, there exist
equilibria with steady-state redistribution when immigrants stay permanently and their children
are granted the right to vote.
6 Discussion and Extensions
6.1 Distortionary taxation
Throughout the paper we have assumed that taxation is non-distortionary and that feasible tax
rates ranged from zero to r  1. We now provide an extension where taxes distort labor supply
and, as a result, an upper bound on the tax rate appears endogenously.34 Consider the following
small departure from our setup. Let us assume that the utility functions of unskilled and skilled
workers are given, respectively, by
U1(c;l) = u(c) (22)
U2(c;l) = u(c)   v(l); (23)
where (c;l) are consumption and labor bundles. Unskilled workers inelastically supply labor
(one unit) while skilled workers make a consumption-leisure choice. Function v(l) measures the
disutility from work. We assume it is positive, increasing, and strictly convex. In this context,
given policies (k;r) the competitive equilibrium allocation for the period is characterized by the
following system of equations:
MRS(c2;l2) = F2(l2k)(1   r) (24)
c1 = (1   r)F1(l2k) + rf(l2k) (25)
c2 = (1   r)F2(l2k) + rf(l2k): (26)
Under standard regularity conditions, this system has a unique solution for (c1;c2;l2). We can
now dene the indirect utility functions dened over current policies as vi(k;r) = u(ci(k;r)), for skill
type i = 1;2. It is easy to show the following two properties regarding voters' policy preferences.
33This would not be the case if the upward mobility condition (equation (6)) were not satised. As we argued earlier,
this is only a sucient condition and can be relaxed easily. Moreover, Appendix 2 demonstrates that conditions (5)
and (6) are realistic.
34An alternative way to introduce distortionary taxation is by assuming that only a share of GDP is available for
consumption. The rest is lost due to ineciencies associated to redistributive taxation. In the political economy
literature it is common to assume a quadratic functional form.
19First, for any value of k, skilled voters' preferred level of redistribution is r2 = 0. Being the rich,
skilled workers obviously dislike taxation. Second, for any value of k, unskilled voter's preferred tax
rate, r1 is strictly lower than one. At a tax rate equal to one, skilled workers maximize utility by
working zero hours. Assuming both inputs are essential in production this implies zero consumption
for unskilled workers. Provided the marginal disutility of work is low enough at l2 = 0, it will be
the case that unskilled voters' preferred tax rate will be positive (r1 > 0). In conclusion, imposing
r = 1 in our main analysis is equivalent to assuming non-distortionary taxation. Assuming r < 1
is the reduced form of a model where taxation is distortionary.
6.2 Endogenous skills
This section sketches a simple extension of the model where individuals make investment decisions
in skills. We argue that the steady state of the majority voting equilibrium of this extended model
coincides with the steady state of the main model.
Let us take as given the sequence of immigration ows and tax rates for all periods. At each
period, each individual chooses whether to invest in education by comparing the increase in con-
sumption, c2   c1, to the cost of acquiring skills. We assume that the monetary cost of education
(tuition) is negligible but it takes eort to graduate (for instance, it requires to study hard). In
particular,  denotes the disutility of the eort needed to obtain a degree. That is, an individual
chooses to invest in skills if and only if
c2   c1  : (27)
We also assume that the disutility of eort is idiosyncratic, drawn from a probability distribution
(Pi) that depends on the skills of the parents. Moreover, we assume that the children of skilled
parents tend to have a lower disutility of eort. For example, it is plausible that children with
college-educated parents receive more help with their homework from their parents than the children
of less educated parents. Formally, we assume that the distribution of the disutility of eort for
children of unskilled parents (P1) rst-order stochastically dominates the distribution for children of
skilled parents (P2). Using the expression for equilibrium consumption and aggregating individual
decisions, the fraction of individuals with i-type parents that invest in education is given by
pi(kt;rt) = Pi ((1   rt)[F2(kt)   F1(kt)]); (28)
for i = 1;2.35 Unlike in the main model, here the transition probabilities are not constant but a
function of the current period's policies. In particular, the share of individuals with i-type parents
that become skilled is a decreasing function of the skilled-unskilled labor-force ratio (kt) and the tax
rate (rt). The intuition is simple. The skill premium is lower at higher levels of the skilled-unskilled
ratio, which reduces the incentive to invest in skills. Similarly, higher tax rates reduce the return
to investment in skills. In the limit, if the tax rate equals one, consumption is equal for both skill
levels but becoming skilled is costly. Hence, no one invests in education (p1 = p2 = 0).
Furthermore, we note that the share of children with skilled parents choosing to become edu-
cated is larger than the analogous share for children with unskilled parents. That is, p2(kt;rt) >
35Recall that ci = (1   r)Fi(1;k) + rf(k).
20p1(kt;rt) at all values of (kt;rt) for which there is a skill premium in terms of consumption. This
property is related to our intergenerational persistence assumption (equation (5)) but somewhat
weaker. It is clear that by assuming that, over the relevant values of (k;r), disutility costs are
relatively high for most children of unskilled parents (so that p1 is close to zero) and low enough
for most children of skilled parents (so that p2 is close to one), our assumption of intergenerational
persistence will hold. It is easy to show that there exist distributional assumptions for (P1;P2)
such that the upward mobility condition (equation (6)) will also be satised. Under these assump-
tions, the steady state of the extended model coincides with the steady state of the main model.
But, clearly, transition dynamics will be richer in the model with endogenous education since the
transition probabilities are now endogenously varying over time.
7 Conclusions
As noted by Hirschman (2001), immigration played a major role in the creation of the welfare
state in the US. The vote of the immigrants that had arrived over the preceding decades and their
children was decisive in several elections in the 1930s and for decades to come. The analysis in this
paper suggests that political support for redistribution will remain strong in the US and in other
high-immigration countries, provided that immigrants and their children can continue to access
citizenship (voting rights) within a reasonably short period of time.
Our main ndings complement the work by Hassler et al (2002) in their analysis on the future of
the welfare state. In their environment skill accumulation is endogenous but the demographic struc-
ture is assumed to be time-invariant. Their main result is that there are equilibria with long-run
redistribution, although other equilibria with no redistribution exist as well. In this paper we have
analyzed a dierent environment, where immigration-driven demographics play the key role. Our
main result also speaks to the persistence of income redistribution arising from political economy
forces. Namely, we have shown the existence of equilibria with long-run redistribution provided
that immigration is permanent and citizenship determined by the place of birth. Conversely, our
analysis suggests that if immigrants do not vote political support for redistribution will erode and
may eventually lead to drastic reductions in the size of the welfare state.
Our results also resonate in the public debate over immigration policy. Currently, several
countries are considering undertaking profound reforms of their immigration policies. Certainly
in the US, one aspect that is particularly contentious is whether to oer immigrants a track to
citizenship. While most Democrats support this option, the vast majority of Republicans oppose
it.36 The analysis in this paper oers an explanation based on the political economy of income
redistribution. We have shown that redistribution is only sustainable in the long run if immigrants
are allowed to stay permanently and to become enfranchised. In equilibrium, unskilled voters
behave strategically by supporting unskilled immigration (up to a point), in order to maintain the
required political support to sustain income redistribution.
36This was the main reason why the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 proposed by senators John
McCain and Ted Kennedy failed to come into law, despite the support of President George W. Bush. For more
details, see http://en.wikipedia.org for 'Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007'.
21The analysis conducted here also has interesting empirical implications for the growing liter-
ature on the determinants of individual attitudes toward immigration that also consider its scal
consequences (for instance, Dustmann and Preston 2000, and Facchini and Mayda 2007). Namely,
individual skill or current income levels are not sucient to predict voters' views on immigration,
unless we control for some country-specic variables. For instance, unskilled voters are likely to have
dierent views over unskilled immigration if their respective countries dier in whether immigrants
can obtain the right to vote, or in prospects of upward economic mobility.
One virtue of the framework developed here is its tractability, which allows for a number of
interesting extensions. A particularly relevant extension from a public policy perspective is to
focus on inter-generational redistribution. Several authors have explored the relationship between
immigration and Social Security (Storesletten 2000, Fehr, Jokisch and Kotliko 2005). However,
these studies take policies as given and do not explore the political economy implications. Another
important question that could be investigated building on the model presented here is the analysis
of gaps in the political views of natives and immigrants. For instance, one could allow for dierences
in the economic prospects of the children of natives and the children of immigrants. This gap in
opportunities is likely to map into gaps in political views. Understanding the political views of
second-generation immigrants is the key political challenge for the next decade in many countries.
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25Appendix 1: Intergenerational mobility in the US
This appendix provides a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the parameters governing intergen-
erational mobility in the model. I use individual survey data from the General Social Survey for
the United States, which contains information about the educational attainment of parents and
children for many individuals and many cohorts. Let us dene an individual as being skilled if he
or she had 14 years of education or more (some college) and let us say that an individual comes from
a skilled family if his or her father was skilled. Ortega and Tanaka (2006) analyze changes in the
eects of paternal and maternal education on educational attainment. I estimate pi by calculating
the fraction of skilled individuals that were born in a family of type i = 1;2. I nd that b p1 = 0:33
and b p2 = 0:78, with very small standard errors. When the estimation is restricted to the subsample
of children with foreign-born parents the results are quite similar: b p1 = 0:37 and b p2 = 0:83. Note
that these estimates satisfy that p1 > 1   p2 and p1 < 0:5 < p2.
Appendix 2: Some useful algebra
Let Y = F(L1;L2) be a constant returns to scale production function, with standard neoclassical





Let us also dene the skilled-unskilled ratio k = L2=L1. By homogeneity of degree zero and some
algebra we can show the following properties:




F(1;k) = F1(k) + kF2(k) (31)












(1 + k)2 : (34)
These properties are used throughout the proofs.
26Appendix 3: Proofs
Proof proposition 1. As shown in the main text, there is a unique solution to the static
optimal policy problem. It is given by (k);r) = (b(n);r). Indeed, the solution is the same even if
the social welfare function uses the after-migration population (L1(t);L2(t)) as weights.
We now turn to the dynamic problem. Let us conjecture that the policy rule is the static
optimal policy, that is, (K(n);R(n)) = (b(n);r). Below we verify this conjecture in three steps.
First of all, we need to compute the continuation values under the conjectured policy rule.
Under the policy rule, for type i = 1;2,
Vi(n) = u((1   r)Fi(b(n)) + rf(b(n))) + Ci (M(b(n))) (35)
= vi((b(n);r)) + Ci (M(b(n))); (36)
where ci(k;r) is the consumption level for i   type workers when the after-migration skilled-
unskilled ratio is k and the tax rate is r.
Using the denition of Ci(n) and substituting it forward we obtain
Ci(n) = (1   pi)V1(n) + piV2(n) (37)




t [(1   pi)v1(b(nt);r) + piv2(b(nt);r)] (39)
where nt = (M b)t(n) is the state in period t, which is obtained by composing t-times function
(M  b)(n) = M(b(n)).
The second step is to provide sucient conditions for functions C1(n) and C2(n) to be increasing.
First, we note that (M b)t is an increasing function, being the composition of increasing functions.
Next, let us consider the indirect utility functions dened over current policies:
v1(k;r) = u((1   r)F1(b(n)) + rf(b(n)))v2(k;r) = u((1   r)F2(b(n)) + rf(b(n))): (40)
Clearly, function v1(k;r) is increasing in k. This follows from F12 > 0 and the fact that we are
restricting to situations where F2(k) > F1(k). Regarding v2(k;r) , it is also immediate to note that
it is increasing in k if r = 1. For cases with r < 1, we need to make additional assumptions. A
sucient (but not necessary) condition is
@e2
@k
(k;r) = (1   (r))F22(k) + rf0(k) > 0 (41)
for all k 2 [b(n);b(n)]. 37 Henceforth, we assume that this condition holds. It now follows that
both C1(n) and C2(n) are increasing functions.
The third step is to check that there are no protable one-period deviations from the action
suggested by the conjectured policy rule. That is, consider the problem of choosing the current













2 and r = 0:9. Then
@e2
@k (k;r) > 0 for k 2
(0:07;0:70).
27First, we note that the choice of the tax rate is purely static. Hence, it is clear that it coincides
with the static solution, r = r. Now we turn to the choice of immigration policy. As we know, the
static best policy is b(n), which follows from the rst term in the objective function being increasing
in k (given the optimal tax rate). We have also established that the second term is increasing in k
as well. Therefore it follows that k = b(n). This veries the conjecture.
Proof lemma 1. Let n  1  and suppose that (k1;r1) is the utility-maximizing policy pair
for an unskilled voter, with r1 < r. Since the continuation value only depends on k1, pair (k1;r) is
preferred over (k1;r1) if and only if v1(k1;r) > v1(k1;r1), that is
(1   r)F1(k1) + rf(k1) > (1   r1)F1(k1) + r1f(k1):
But F2(k1) > F1(k1) implies f(k1) > F1(k1): As a result, the inequality holds. Hence, in any
equilibrium, R(n) = r if n  1 . A symmetric argument proves that R(n) = 0 if n  1+.
Proof proposition 2. Let us start by partitioning the state space as follows. Dene sets
U = fn 2 
 : n  1 g
S = fn 2 
 : n  1+g;
respectively, the set of states with an unskilled majority and the set of states with a skilled majority.
Observe that a(1)   implies that 1 2 
, that is, the state space includes states with a skilled
majority and states with an unskilled majority.
Next, let us compute continuation values along the equilibrium path. Abusing notation, let U
denote any state in set U. According to the policy rule,
V1(U) = v1(;r) + C1(U) (42)
V2(U) = v2(;r) + C2(U) (43)
V1(S) = v1(;0) + C1(S) (44)
V2(S) = v2(;0) + C2(S): (45)
Using denition Ci(n) = (1 pi)V1(n)+piV2(n), and previous expressions for the value functions







1   p1 p1
1   p2 p2

u(F1 ()) + C1(S)
u(F2 ()) + C2(S)

:







(1   )[1   (p2   p1)]

(1   p1)   (p2   p1) p1
1   p2 p2   (p2   p1)

(1   p1)u(F1 ()) + p1u(F2 ())
(1   p2)u(F1 ()) + p2u(F2 ())

:
Analogously, we can derive the system of equations for expected continuation values in unskilled-







(1   )[1   (p2   p1)]

(1   p1)   (p2   p1) p1
1   p2 p2   (p2   p1)

(1   p1)v1(;r) + p1v2(;r)
(1   p2)v1(;r) + p2v2(;r)

:
28Let us now analyze voters' best responses given these continuation values. Let us start with
unskilled voters in unskilled-majority states. Knowing that it is always in their interest to choose
maximum redistribution, unskilled voters rank current policies according to
W1(k;r) = v1(k;r) + C1(M(k)); (46)
where k 2 [a(n);b(n)]. Now notice that among k  , C1(Mk) = C1(U) is constant and
therefore  dominates all other k  . Similarly, b(n) dominates k 2 (;b(n)]. Therefore, choosing
 will be optimal if and only if
v1(b(1);r)   v1(;r)   [C1(U)   C1(S)]: (47)
Substituting in the expressions obtained earlier for C1(U) and C1(S), and imposing full persis-
tence, (p1;p2) = (0;1), the expression above simplies to:
v1(1;r)  (1   )v1(b(1);r) + u[F1(1)]: (48)
When this condition holds with strict inequality (assumption 1), continuity in (p1;p2) implies
that unskilled voters will not want to deviate from the prescribed action provided intergenerational
persistence is high enough.
We now turn to skilled voters' best responses. In states with a skilled majority, skilled voters
rank current policies by means of
W2(k;0) = u(F2 (k)) + C2(M(k));
where k 2 [a(n);b(n)] and I imposed zero redistribution. Now notice that among k < ,
C2(M(k)) = C2(U) is constant and therefore a(n) dominates all other values. Similarly,  dominates
k 2 [;b(n)]. Therefore, choosing  will be optimal if and only if
u(F2 (a(1)))   u(F2 ())    [C2(S)   C2(U)]  0. (49)
It is straightforward to check that under full persistence, (p1;p2) = (0;1), condition (49) sim-
plies to
u[F2(1)]  (1   )u[F2(a(1))] + v2(1;r):
When this condition holds with strict inequality (assumption 2), expression (49) will also hold
for high enough intergenerational persistence. Finally, for high enough intergenerational persistence
for both types of workers, the proposed rule will be an equilibrium policy rule.
Proof proposition 4. First, we compute equilibrium continuation values. Given that there




1 2 if n  1 
u[Fi(a(n)]+vi(n;r]
1 2 if n  1+ (50)
We note that V1(n) may be discontinuous at n = 1. But it is piece-wise increasing. That is, to
the left and to the right of the discontinuity it is increasing.
Second, we need to ensure that there are no protable one-period deviations for unskilled voters
in states with unskilled majority, that is, for fn  1 g = (b 1(1);1 ].38 Since V1(n) is piece-wise
increasing, the most tempting one-period deviation is (k;r) = (1;r). Such a deviation will not be
protable if and only if
v1(b(n);r) + V1(b(n))  v1(1;r) + V1(1 1): (51)
38Recall that  = 1 under full persistence.
29at every n  1 . Since the left-hand side is increasing in n, the condition will hold if and only
if it holds at the lowest value of n, namely at n = b 1(1). That is, if and only if
V1(1+  V1(1 ): (52)
Substituting in the expressions for the continuation values we obtain that there will be no
protable one-period deviation for unskilled workers in unskilled majority states if and only if
v1(b(1);r)   u[F1(a(1))]  [v1(1;r)   u[F1(1)]]: (53)
Let us now turn to skilled voters. We need to ensure that there are no protable one-period
deviations from the prescribed rule in skilled majority states. These states are given by fn  1+g =
[1+;a 1(1)). The payo associated to current choices is given by
W2(k;0) = u[F2(k)] + V2(M(k)); (54)
for k 2 [a(n);b(n)] where we are making use of the fact that optimal choices always involve a
zero tax rate. The continuation values are given by the expressions derived earlier. Unfortunately,
function V2(n) is not monotonic. Thus there is no neat analytical characterization of the most
tempting one-period deviation. As a result, we cannot derive a simple necessary and sucient
condition as for the case of unskilled voters.
The following is a sucient (but not necessary condition). Suppose
max
k2[a(1);b2(1)]
fu[F2(k)] + V2(k)g  min
n2[1;a 1]
fu[F2(a(n))] + V2(a(n))g: (55)
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Figure 3b: Long-run redistribution